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Abstract
 The study analize the implementation of the democratic model and the government 
system in Indonesia. Checks and Balances among democracy pillars is the main focus of the 
analysis. The important finding of the study is that the democracy in Indonesia does not have 
a consistency in term of system.
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 The separation of powers known as “trias politica” is a model of government that 
is commonly used in countries that implement a democratic system. Democracy began 
in Ancient Athens in Greece. That’s where the embryo of democracy developed. But what 
was done in Athens was a form of democracy carried out directly by the people. This is 
understandable because at that time Athens was a city state that had no population as many 
as the countries that existed in the period thereafter and now.
 Such a power separation model was first discovered in ancient Greece, then 
developed and spread to various countries over time. The ancient Roman Republic, among 
others, applied this model, as stated in the Roman Republic’s constitution. With this model 
the power holders of government are separated or divided into pillars consisting of: (1) 
executive, (2) legislative and (3) judicial.
 Proponents of this ideology argue that the separation of powers will be able to keep 
democracy in the right corridor, and with this separation of powers can be avoided the tyranny 
of the ruler. Meanwhile, opponents of this ideology argue that the separation of powers, will 
slow down the course of government, there will even be a tendency for the executive pillar to 
become more dominant than the legislature and executive performance to be unaccountable, 
especially in countries that apply presidential systems.
 In practice there is no one country that can exercise absolute separation of powers. 
Overlapping and symmetrical power always occur in government. But in general, in terms 
of the power of government can be categorized into two categories, namely: (1) the state that 
implements the separation of powers or (2) the state that conducts centralization of power.
1.2. Separation of Power Mechanism in Indonesia
 Indonesian constitution, namely the 1945 Constitution (abbreviated as UUD 1945), 
which has been amended for 4 times has written and implies that Indonesia as a democratic 
country basically adheres to the separation of powers. Government or executive power is in 
the hands of the President (article 4), the power to form the law is in the hands of the House of 
Representatives (DPR) (article 20), while the judicial authority is in the hands of the Supreme 
Court (MA) (article 24) and the judiciary under Supreme Court and the Constitutional 
Court (MK) (article 24 C). In addition to those institutions there are three other institutions 
mentioned in our constitution that has the duties based on this separation of powers, namely 
the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), the Regional Representative Council (DPD), and 
the Judicial Commission (KY). Furthermore, there is another power, namely the authority 
of the auditor held by the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK). Indeed, our constitution explicitly 
does not regulate the mechanism of relations or interactions between pillars in the power of 
state administration. Based on the constitution the study will  analyze the actualization of the 
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checks and balances in Indonesia.
1.3.  Methodology
 Qualitative method was used in the study. Desk study and secondary data also been 
applied to as the supporting data of the study.
II. Theoretical Concept of the Application of Separation of Power in Indonesia
 Terminology of democracy is defined as “rule by the demos”, where “demos” itself 
can be interpreted as the public or the people. But the most easily understood is the statement 
delivered by Abraham Lincoln in his remarks delivered in Gettysburg that democracy is: 
“Government of the people, by the people, and for the people”.  Therefore democracy implies 
that sovereignty or power is in the hands of the people, by the people and for the people. But 
in its implementation in almost all democracies, the one who rules or has political power is a 
group of people who are elected and elected by the common people.
 Meanwhile, in his book Lijphart said that democracy can be interpreted as a 
government of the people and for the people. In this thinking, Lijphart presented models of 
democracy which were said to be close to ideal. To support this acceptance Lijphat quoted 
Dahl’s opinion. In this connection, according to Dahl, democracy can be said to be ideal if 
there are 8 elements in managing the nation, namely:
1. Freedom to form and become a member of the organization,
2. Freedom of expression,
3. Right to vote,
4. Chance to become an official,
5. The right of political leaders to compete and get support and choice,
6. Getting alternative sources of information,
7. Free and fair elections, and
8. Government policy makers depend on the votes and other preferences of voters.
 Furthermore, according to Lijphart, there is a very different model of democracy 
in the application of the 8 dimensions of Dahl above, namely democracy that applies the 
principle of majoritarianism and democracy that implements consensus,
 More specifically, Lijphart argues that the Westminster Model applied to countries 
influenced by the United Kingdom is basically a majoritarian model. For the example, the 
democratic system that is implemented in the UK and New Zealand. This model concerns 9 
interrelated elements as happened in England, namely:
1. Concentration of executive power because it is supported by a majority party in the 
parliament and cabinet,
2. The consolidation of power and cabinet domination because the executive and legislative 
are integrated,
3. The asymmetrical bicameralism between the House of Lords and the House of Common,
4. The two-party system, namely the Conservative and Liberal parties,
5. A single-dimensional party system caused by a homogeneous society so that party 
differentiation is based on differences in socio-economic policies,
6. The pluralist electoral system, the district system,
7. Government that is centralized and in the form of unity,
8. The constitution is not written and the highest position is in the hands of parliament, and
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9. Exclusive representative democracy because there is no referendum.
 But in his explanation Lijphart said that Britain was not an ideal Westminster 
model because of the various inconsistencies in the application of the 9 elements. The ideal 
Westminster model is implemented in New Zealand.
 Meanwhile the consensus model is a model that is formed in a very pluralistic 
society as happened in Switzerland and Belgium. This model concerns 8 elements to prevent 
the emergence of majority tyranny, these elements are:
1. Large coalition of executives,
2. Formal and informal separation of powers,
3. Bicameralism is balanced with the presence of representatives of minority groups,
4. A multiparty system that reflects the plurality of its people,
5. Multidimensional party system because of heterogeneous society,
6. Proportional representation,
7. Federalism is territorial and non-territorial to protect minority groups, and
8. Written constitution and minority veto rights.
 In practice, both models can basically carry out the form of direct democracy in 
terms of decision making on certain problems. In its implementation direct democracy is 
carried out through a referendum, where all people who have the right to vote are directly 
involved in decision making.
 The United States, which has always been regarded as a pioneer of contemporary 
democracy, implements a democratic system that lies between the Westminster model and 
the consensus model. Elements taken from the Westminster model appear in:
1. Concentration of executive power in the hands of the president,
2. Two-party system,
3. The electoral system uses the district system, and
4. Single-party party system.
 While the application of elements from the consensus model appears in:
1. Separation of power,
2. Balanced bicameral system,
3. Federalism, and
4. Written constitution and minority veto rights.
 In terms of the implementation of direct democracy, the United States is in a 
moderate position, however the United States is an example for the application of a mixed 
democratic system between majoritarian and consensus. Of all the countries observed by 
Lijphart, the democracy he applied basically could be categorized into the three types of 
democratic models.
 Regarding the efforts to run the government, Lijphart explained that the Executive 
can be run by: (1) Majority or power, and (2) Sharing power (coalition). In the meantime, the 
coalition is carried out in the form of: (1) Policy-blind basis coalition, and (2) Policy-based 
coalition.
 In terms of the form of government, there are at least two forms, namely: (1) 
presidential and (2) parliamentary. Meanwhile in terms of the number of rooms in the 
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 Additionally, Lijphart was expressing the existence of various models of democracy 
in accordance with various aspects of society. According to him, “majoritarian democracy” 
is very appropriate when applied to a homogeneous society, while for a heterogeneous or 
pluralist society it is more suitable to use “consensus democracy”.
 In both models of democracy, a bicameral parliamentary system can be applied. 
He further suggested that to model of the “majoritarian democracy” is more appropriate 
if applied asymmetric bicameralism, or an unequal bicameral parliamentary system. This 
means that one of the chamber has a greater function and power than the other chamber.
 Whereas for countries that implement “consensus democracy” it is more appropriate 
to apply the parliament which is “balanced bicameralism”. This means that the two chambers 
in the parliament have the same function and power. Lijphart explained more clearly that 
in terms of its authority, when using “asymmetric bicameralism” is often referred to as “soft 
bicameralism”, while those who apply “balanced bicameralism” are also referred to as “strong 
bicameralism”.
 Based on these opinions and theories, for Indonesia, a pluralistic nation (which 
has diversity), the appropriate democratic system is “consensus democracy”, by applying 
the parliamentary system “bicameralism”, and the power between chambers in balanced 
bicameralism or also called “strong bicameralism”. Then by referring to the government 
models presented by Lijphart, the model of government that is suitable in Indonesia is the 
presidential system, by applying a “coalition cabinet” from various parties that have the same 
principle (policy-based coalition).
 What we see in the practice of democracy in Indonesia, we can conclude that:
1. The democracy adopted in Indonesia is a mixture of majoritarian and consensus, proven 
by our constitution, its preamble determines the consensus of democracy (in accordance 
to the fourth principle of Pancasila), while the body is applied direct presidential 
elections, it means majoritarian democracy.
2. In addition, the preamble of the 1945 Constitution also stipulates representative 
democracy, but in the presidential election using direct democracy,
3. The government is presidential system, but the president has no veto rights as is applied 
in countries that implement this system, so the legislature in principle has stronger 
legislative rights,
4. The cabinet formed is a policy-blinded coalition, and
5. The parliamentary system applied is two chamberrs (DPR and DPD), but the legislative 
power between the two is not equal (asymmetric bicameralism).
Although the separation of powers in Indonesia is applied, but from the various realities of 
the implementation of the democratic model and the government system, what is applied 
in Indonesia does not have consistency between one system and another. Therefore the 
application of the principle of check and balances in Indonesia will be imperfect.
III. Actualization of Checks and Balances in Indonesia
 The separation of power model known as “Trias Politica” in contemporary political 
science was first introduced by John Locke (1632-1704) a British philosopher and Montesquieu 
(1689-1755) a French political philosopher, according to this model of government power 
separated or divided into pillars consisting of: (1) executive, (2) legislative and (3) judicial. 
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There are actually differences between their opinions. John Locke included judicial power in 
executive power, while Montesquie viewed the power of the court as a stand-alone power.
 Theoretically the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature can 
be analyzed by looking at the method of election. Basically, parliamentarians are accountable 
to their voters. Likewise the chief executive in this case the president, is also accountable 
to the voters. Both have different accountability, so clearly they must always uphold their 
respective accountability. If they violate this accountability, the “punishment” they will get is 
political punishment, that is, they will not get the trust of the voters, or will not be reelected.
 In its development, although these three powers have been separated from one 
another, there is still a need for checks and balances between them, where each branch of 
power can supervise and balance other branches of power. This mechanism is needed so that 
there are no abuses of the power they have.
 The easily recognizable checks and balances mechanism in Indonesia is between 
the legislature and the executive. But what is meant by the legislature here is only the DPR, 
because the DPD is constitutionally “not having” the power to make laws. The mechanism is 




 However, Indonesian constitution in Article 20, in the case of making laws, only 
allows an unbalanced checks mechanism. The power of the DPR in the matter of the law 
basically cannot be denied by the government, as evidenced by the provisions contained in 
paragraph 5 of the article. Where a bill that has been jointly agreed upon, must be promulgated 
within 30 days, even without the president’s endorsement. The effort of checks from the 
government can only be done through the Constitutional Court when the law is contrary to 
the constitution.
 Meanwhile, our constitution basically does not provide an opportunity for a checks 
and balances mechanism to occur, both between the legislature and the judiciary, and 
between the executive and the judiciary. Judicial power in our constitutional system (based 
on the constitution) cannot be corrected or controlled by other powers. This power is only 
supervised by the Judicial Commission which is also on the judicial pillar.
 Of the various provisions, the executive position in Indonesia is very weak. All 
activities that will be carried out by the executive cannot be carried out without control 
and decisions from the DPR. Because all executive activities must be contained in budget 
documents whose budgetary powers are in the hands of the DPR. The various rights held by 
the DPR both as individuals and as institutions. They have very strong power to control and 
even to influence the executive.
 Thus the actual legislative pillars, especially the DPR, and the judicial pillars (MA 
and MK) in Indonesia can do their work without control from other pillars. There is no one 
mechanism written in our constitution that provides opportunities for checks and balances 
on these two pillars.
 In relation to the National Development Strategy, the existing system can only be 
subjected to a mechanism of checks from the DPR to the executive (government), through 
various functions it has. And after the development is carried out every year an audit is 
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conducted by another authority, namely the BPK.
 Therefore, the success of the National Development Strategy depends heavily on 
how the executive can make various efforts to be able to “make the DPR understand and 
approve” various plans to be carried out by the executive, in the form of budget approval, as 
outlined in the State Budget. 
 So that, it is undeniably if an Indonesian president (in the presidential system) 
always considers the power in the DPR when composing his cabinet, this effort is carried out 
nothing else to get support from the DPR. With the support of the DPR, all plans made by the 
executive, which promised in the election campaign, will be financed and implemented.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
4.1. Conclussion
 Indonesia is implementing separation of powers, but the model of democracy and 
the government system that is applied in Indonesia does not have consistency between one 
system and another. As a result of this inconsistency, the implementation of checks and 
balances among power holders experienced various obstacles.
 So that, to implement a consistent separation of powers in the future, there needs to 
be a complete and comprehensive review of the constitution. To this end, an amendment of 
constitution is needed. 
 Conceptually, Indonesia has to review the constitution which is related to choices of:
1. Representative democracy or direct democracy,
2. Majoritarian democracy or consensus democracy,
3. Presidential or Parliamentary,
4. Policy-based coalition or Policy-blind coalition,
5. Bicameral or Unicameral Parliament
6. If bicameral, the power between chambers is equal or not equivalent.
7. Tight Separation of powers or loose.
4.2.  Recommendation
 As the recommendation, for Indonesia, a pluralistic nation, the most appropriate 
democracy system is “consensus democracy”, by applying a parliamentary system of 
“bicameralism”, and the power between chambers in a balanced bicameralism or namely 
“strong bicameralism”, the government system is “presidential”, by implementing a “coalition 
cabinet” from various parties that have the same principle (policy-based coalition).
 In order to achieve The Great Indonesia, it has to be a consistent in implementing 
political and governance system.
References
Almond, Gabriel A. and G. Bingham Powell, Jr, 1996, Comparative Politics Today: A World 
View, 6th ed. Harper Colins College Publishers, New York, NY.
Birch, Anthony H., 2001, The Concept & Theories of Modern Democracy, Routledge, Lon-
don, UK. 
Bock, Gisela and Susan James (editor), 1996, Beyond Equality & Difference: Citizenship, 
Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity, Routledge, London and New York.
226
Deddy Supriady Bratakusumah 
Jurnal Perencanaan Pembangunan
The Indonesian Journal of Development Planning
Vol II No. 3 - Dec 2018
Barber, Kathleen L, 2000, A Right to Representation, Ohio State University Press, Colum-
bus, OH. 
Chilcote, Ronald H., 1981, Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for Paradigm, 
Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.
Eulau, Heinz and John C. Wahlke, et.al, 1978, The Politics of Representation: Continuities in 
Theory and Research, Sage Publications. Beverly Hills, CA.
Feith, Herberth, 1996, Indonesia’s Political Symbols and Their Wielders, in Jason L. Finkle 
and Richard W. Gable, Political Development and Social Change, John Willey & 
Sons, Inc, New York, NY. 
Heywood, Andrew, 1999, Political Theory, An Introduction, Palgrave, New York, NY.
Heywood, Andrew, 2002. Politics. Palgrave. New York, NY.
Lijphart, Arendt, 1984, Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government 
in Twenty-One Countries, Yale University Press, New Haven and London.
Lipset, SM., 1963, Economic Development and Democracy, Anchor Books, New York.
Magenda, Burhan D., Dinamika Hubungan Eksekutif Dengan Legislatif Dalam Politik Keta-
tanegaraan Indonesia, pada Gloria Juris, Volume 7, Nomor2, Mei-Agustus 2007.
Moertopo, Ali, 1974, Strategi Politik Nasional, Yayasan Proklamasi, CSIS, Jakarta.
Mosca, G., 1939, The Ruling Class, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY.
Republic of Indonesia, 2004, The Constitution of 1945, Jakarta.
Sjamsudin, Nazarudin, 1989, Integrasi Politik di Indonesia, PT. Gramedia, Jakarta
Seligman, Lester G., 1966, The Role of Elites, dalam Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, 
Political Developmnet and Social Change, John Willey & Sons Inc, New York, NY.
FX Andy Sutrisno 1
Research and Development Agency of Surakarta Local Government - Indonesia
Bakti Setiawan 2
Graduate Program of Urban and Regional Planning, Gadjah Mada University - Indonesia
